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     / .:::. \           /   [ tDd // THE DEAD DOG ]   \           / .:::. \     
    /[ x   x ]\         /  .::     MMXXVI A.D.     ::.  \         /[ x   x ]\    
     \ \V_V/ /         /    LATRANDO, VULNERA INVENIO    \         \ \V_V/ /     
      `-(U)-'         (_=================================_)         `-(U)-'      
tdd@wire:~$""/var/wire/tweets/week^C
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(: `--------------------------' :)
 )   the bone // x wire 7-day   ( 
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> /var/wire/tweets/week/bone.article :: [ 92 x posts read // updated 2026-11-15 05:08 UTC ]

Backdoored Builds, Cloud Identity Confusion, and the Silent Swallow of Your Recon Tooling

The loudest drop of the week is a supply-chain kill chain, not a parser bug. @0xLupin and the Depi crew gave @0xMadder and @_Worty six months to break things and they came back having found a way to backdoor the next release of OpenAI's Codex -- the chain reads injected task content -> sandbox escape -> secret exfiltration -> poisoned build artifact, i.e. straight into the developer-tool supply chain (full writeup). The uncomfortable takeaway: the sandbox around a coding tool is now upstream of every repo that tool touches, and 'isolated' execution environments that share secrets with the host stop being isolated the moment untrusted input crosses the boundary. @0xLupin capped the week by pulling an all-nighter against a CEO who dared him to hack the company, claiming multiple backdoor paths before even hunting the crit. We believe the all-nighter. We've all run it.

Up in the cloud, @7urb0's episode 200 walkthrough with the Critical Thinking crew is the densest technical material of the window: start from architecture -- what the service provisions, where customer code runs, which identities bridge data plane to control plane -- then treat client-side bugs in cloud dashboards as RCE and account-takeover primitives, since a victim's browser triggering privileged actions or reaching a managed identity does the work for you. A shell in your own data plane is the midpoint, not the finish: inventory credentials, connectors, and control-plane calls, then test whether the provider trusted a customer-controlled instance too much. Identity delegation is where the boundaries quietly fail. @albinowax flagged the matching shift in program culture -- programs that used to rage at pivoting now demand it, break in, grab creds, go as far as you can -- and suspects a pile of unpatched high/crit is rotting in closed reports. Meanwhile Google quietly capped the 1.2x Exceptional Quality bonus at $5,000 for post-November-5 reports, a nice 'alignment with impact' that reads more like payout compression when the pivot-or-nothing era is ramping up.

The device-hunting tradecraft worth stealing this week: no UART does not mean no firmware -- pull it straight off the flash chip and let a messy decompile point you somewhere -- and a root shell beats source code every time, because tokens and keys only live in memory at runtime. Devices that phone home are just web targets: rebuild the cloud API and replay it like a JS client to hunt device-to-cloud pivots. Host lists are never as complete as they look, and any check that merely verifies a value appears 'somewhere in a URL' falls over the moment you move that value into a query parameter and point the host somewhere else. Twenty years of broken assumptions, still shipping in firmware. @wunderwuzzi23 banked an Apple bounty for CVE-2026-64750 the same week, a reminder that the quiet researchers keep cashing while the timeline argues about the future.

Your recon tooling is lying to you, and @Jhaddix named the mechanism: automation-detection filters silently swallow requests from curl, wget, Puppeteer, Playwright, and headless Chrome, and your harness gives up without telling you -- roll your own requester or you're crawling a hallucinated target. @NahamSec nearly ate the same lesson from the other direction, burning a session fixated on internal host and metadata endpoints while the actual bounty sat elsewhere; metadata envy is not a methodology. On the tooling side, Caido v0.59.0 shipped precise capture scoping -- Intercept > Capture now splits All traffic, In-scope only, and custom rules into Capture and Passthrough host lists -- which is exactly the hygiene you want when you're recording other people's tokens. Tight release. Worth the upgrade.

Proof the primitives still land on real targets: XBOW disclosed an unauthenticated RCE in a U.S. Election Assistance Commission voting resource calculator -- reverse-engineered frontend JavaScript, attack path followed end to end, code execution as root inside the backend container, patched before November 3. No 'isolated demo instance' spin available on that one. @DanielMiessler also pointed at Dawn Song's team's patch-to-exploit work, the discipline of turning a diff into a weapon, which pairs neatly with the Alpine OpenSSH bypass and a single run that patched 948 Linux kernel bugs now sitting in the newsletter queue. Closing hunting angle for you: grab the Codex sandbox-escape writeup and the EAC frontend-reversing path, diff them against every tool that executes 'untrusted' task content next to your secrets, and assume the detection filters ate your last three scans.

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(: `------------------------------------' :)
 )   tweets // x wire (this week // 7d)   ( 
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[ top 10 most noteworthy of 92 entries in this week // 7d ]
Critical unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing U.S. EAC application: frontend JavaScript was reverse-engineered to map the attack path, ending in root code execution inside the backend container.
·source·
+ raw
Thanks to our sponsor this week @Xbow! We just finished the midterms in the USA so, this is relevant: XBOW’s autonomous AI agents discovered a Critical, unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing application belonging to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). The agents reverse-engineered frontend JavaScript, followed the attack path, and proved code execution as root inside the backend container. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed ahead of the November 3 election. Wild! Read the detailed write-up: https://xbow.com/labs/research/how-xbow-found-a-critical-rce-in-an-eac-voting-resource-calculator
Injection-to-sandbox-escape chain leading to secret exfiltration and a software supply-chain compromise; six-month research effort against a major platform.
·source·
+ raw
Prompt injection → sandbox escape → secret exfiltration → OpenAI’s software supply chain. Turns out giving @0xMadder and @_Worty six months to break things was a good idea 👾 Very proud of this one. Go read what they found 👇
Eval-harness take: a mature harness with high enforced standards absorbs new model gains slowly, so flat eval deltas can mean your harness is already doing the heavy lifting.
·source·
+ raw
One way to tell if you have a really good harness / system is if it takes longer for you to see the improvements from new models. If you already have high standards that are represented and enforced in your evals, model improvements are more subtle. @poteto @mattpocockuk
IoT bug-hunting field tips: no UART doesn't mean no firmware -- yank the flash chip and decompile; a runtime root shell beats source since keys/tokens often live only in memory.
·source·
+ raw
Here are some tips from episode 199 on finding IoT bugs: - No UART doesn't mean no firmware, we can just pull it off the flash chip, and even a messy decompile gives AI enough to start RE (go for whatever comes off easiest) - A root shell beats source code, tokens and keys often only live in memory at runtime, so that's where we go dig them up. Of course source code is important, but if you can't get it right now, that's not the end of the world - Devices that ping home are basically web targets, try to rebuild the cloud API and replay it like a JS client to hunt device-to-cloud pivots - Host lists are almost never as complete as they look, since weird internal domains don't always follow the vendor's naming - Checks that only make sure a value shows up somewhere in a URL might get fooled if we stick that value in a query parameter and point the host somewhere else... - If we can make a ...
NahamCon2026 talk covers automating device-hacking workflows against embedded targets; the useful angle is orchestration of recon, firmware extraction, and exploit triage across hardware.
·source·
+ raw
Matt Brown (@nmatt0) is bringing device hacking to the #NahamCon2026 stage. His talk, “Clankers vs Clankers: Using LLMs to Automate Device Hacking,” takes on a question I want to see tested: how far can LLMs take device hacking? Watch live 👉🏼 https://youtube.com/NahamSec.
DEFCON data-duplication village focuses on cloning, imaging, and recovering data from devices and media; expect hardware teardown, chip-off, and forensic duplication workflows rather than network exploitation.
·source·
+ raw
DEFCON's data duplication village is going to be hoppin next year.
Rez0: bug bounty reports prove external exploitability and subsidize finding costs; internal testing alone cannot confirm external reachability.
·source·
+ raw
Keep going!!!! Bug bounty gives companies access to findings via subsidized tokens rather than them paying full api costs. And even when they run hacking agents internally, they don’t know for sure if it’s reachable externally. If you get a bug bounty report, you have proof an external actor can exploit the bug. And you didn’t have to pay api token costs to get it either.
Caido v0.59.0 adds Intercept > Capture modes -- All traffic, In-scope only, or custom rules splitting hosts into Capture and Passthrough lists.
·source·
+ raw
Caido v0.59.0 gives you precise control over what gets recorded. Under Intercept > Capture, choose All traffic, In-scope only, or set Custom rules to separate hosts into Capture and Passthrough lists. Release notes: https://cai.do/36z
2026-11-09 14:08 - [x] "Roobot!, man's best friend. 🖤" by @hypr
Short clip of a legged robot hardware build; nothing exploitable, just servo/actuator eye candy for anyone poking at robotics platforms.
·source·
+ raw
Roobot!, man's best friend. 🖤
cool, even got a bounty for this one from apple 😀 CVE-2026-64750
source: Johann Rehberger (@wunderwuzzi23) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 18:41 UTC
[ notes ]
Rehberger reports an Apple bounty tied to CVE-2026-64750; no technical detail in the post on the vuln class, affected component, or exploit primitive.
[ source excerpt ]
cool, even got a bounty for this one from apple 😀 CVE-2026-64750
Thanks to our sponsor this week @Xbow! We just finished the midterms in the USA so, this is relevant: XBOW’s autonomous AI agents discovered...
source: Jason Haddix (@Jhaddix) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 15:41 UTC
[ notes ]
Critical unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing U.S. EAC application: frontend JavaScript was reverse-engineered to map the attack path, ending in root code execution inside the backend container.
[ source excerpt ]
Thanks to our sponsor this week @Xbow! We just finished the midterms in the USA so, this is relevant: XBOW’s autonomous AI agents discovered a Critical, unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing application belonging to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). The agents reverse-engineered frontend JavaScript, followed the attack path, and proved code execution as root inside the backend container. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed ahead of the November 3 election. Wild! Read the detailed write-up: https://xbow.com/labs/research/how-xbow-found-a-critical-rce-in-an-eac-voting-resource-calculator
Prompt injection → sandbox escape → secret exfiltration → OpenAI’s software supply chain. Turns out giving @0xMadder and @_Worty six months ...
source: Roni Carta (@0xLupin) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 15:21 UTC
[ notes ]
Injection-to-sandbox-escape chain leading to secret exfiltration and a software supply-chain compromise; six-month research effort against a major platform.
[ source excerpt ]
Prompt injection → sandbox escape → secret exfiltration → OpenAI’s software supply chain. Turns out giving @0xMadder and @_Worty six months to break things was a good idea 👾 Very proud of this one. Go read what they found 👇
One way to tell if you have a really good harness / system is if it takes longer for you to see the improvements from new models. If you alr...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 23:46 UTC
[ notes ]
Eval-harness take: a mature harness with high enforced standards absorbs new model gains slowly, so flat eval deltas can mean your harness is already doing the heavy lifting.
[ source excerpt ]
One way to tell if you have a really good harness / system is if it takes longer for you to see the improvements from new models. If you already have high standards that are represented and enforced in your evals, model improvements are more subtle. @poteto @mattpocockuk
Here are some tips from episode 199 on finding IoT bugs: - No UART doesn't mean no firmware, we can just pull it off the flash chip, and eve...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-13 15:45 UTC
[ notes ]
IoT bug-hunting field tips: no UART doesn't mean no firmware -- yank the flash chip and decompile; a runtime root shell beats source since keys/tokens often live only in memory.
[ source excerpt ]
Here are some tips from episode 199 on finding IoT bugs: - No UART doesn't mean no firmware, we can just pull it off the flash chip, and even a messy decompile gives AI enough to start RE (go for whatever comes off easiest) - A root shell beats source code, tokens and keys often only live in memory at runtime, so that's where we go dig them up. Of course source code is important, but if you can't get it right now, that's not the end of the world - Devices that ping home are basically web targets, try to rebuild the cloud API and replay it like a JS client to hunt device-to-cloud pivots - Host lists are almost never as complete as they look, since weird internal domains don't always follow the vendor's naming - Checks that only make sure a value shows up somewhere in a URL might get fooled if we stick that value in a query parameter and point the host somewhere else... - If we can make a ...
Matt Brown (@nmatt0) is bringing device hacking to the #NahamCon2026 stage. His talk, “Clankers vs Clankers: Using LLMs to Automate Device H...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 16:00 UTC
[ notes ]
NahamCon2026 talk covers automating device-hacking workflows against embedded targets; the useful angle is orchestration of recon, firmware extraction, and exploit triage across hardware.
[ source excerpt ]
Matt Brown (@nmatt0) is bringing device hacking to the #NahamCon2026 stage. His talk, “Clankers vs Clankers: Using LLMs to Automate Device Hacking,” takes on a question I want to see tested: how far can LLMs take device hacking? Watch live 👉🏼 https://youtube.com/NahamSec.
DEFCON's data duplication village is going to be hoppin next year.
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 15:53 UTC
[ notes ]
DEFCON data-duplication village focuses on cloning, imaging, and recovering data from devices and media; expect hardware teardown, chip-off, and forensic duplication workflows rather than network exploitation.
[ source excerpt ]
DEFCON's data duplication village is going to be hoppin next year.
Keep going!!!! Bug bounty gives companies access to findings via subsidized tokens rather than them paying full api costs. And even when the...
source: Joseph Thacker (@rez0__) | role: Co-Host (formerly Guest) | published: 2026-11-11 21:24 UTC
[ notes ]
Rez0: bug bounty reports prove external exploitability and subsidize finding costs; internal testing alone cannot confirm external reachability.
[ source excerpt ]
Keep going!!!! Bug bounty gives companies access to findings via subsidized tokens rather than them paying full api costs. And even when they run hacking agents internally, they don’t know for sure if it’s reachable externally. If you get a bug bounty report, you have proof an external actor can exploit the bug. And you didn’t have to pay api token costs to get it either.
Caido v0.59.0 gives you precise control over what gets recorded. Under Intercept > Capture, choose All traffic, In-scope only, or set Custom...
source: Caido Official (@caidoio) | role: Guest Org (Emile Fugulin) | published: 2026-11-11 13:06 UTC
[ notes ]
Caido v0.59.0 adds Intercept > Capture modes -- All traffic, In-scope only, or custom rules splitting hosts into Capture and Passthrough lists.
[ source excerpt ]
Caido v0.59.0 gives you precise control over what gets recorded. Under Intercept > Capture, choose All traffic, In-scope only, or set Custom rules to separate hosts into Capture and Passthrough lists. Release notes: https://cai.do/36z
Roobot!, man's best friend. 🖤
source: Hypr (@hypr) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 14:08 UTC
[ notes ]
Short clip of a legged robot hardware build; nothing exploitable, just servo/actuator eye candy for anyone poking at robotics platforms.
[ source excerpt ]
Roobot!, man's best friend. 🖤