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> /var/wire/tweets/week/bone.article :: [ 92 x posts read // updated 2026-11-15 05:08 UTC ]
Backdoored Builds, Cloud Identity Confusion, and the Silent Swallow of Your Recon Tooling
The loudest drop of the week is a supply-chain kill chain, not a parser bug. @0xLupin and the Depi crew gave @0xMadder and @_Worty six months to break things and they came back having found a way to backdoor the next release of OpenAI's Codex -- the chain reads injected task content -> sandbox escape -> secret exfiltration -> poisoned build artifact, i.e. straight into the developer-tool supply chain (full writeup). The uncomfortable takeaway: the sandbox around a coding tool is now upstream of every repo that tool touches, and 'isolated' execution environments that share secrets with the host stop being isolated the moment untrusted input crosses the boundary. @0xLupin capped the week by pulling an all-nighter against a CEO who dared him to hack the company, claiming multiple backdoor paths before even hunting the crit. We believe the all-nighter. We've all run it.
Up in the cloud, @7urb0's episode 200 walkthrough with the Critical Thinking crew is the densest technical material of the window: start from architecture -- what the service provisions, where customer code runs, which identities bridge data plane to control plane -- then treat client-side bugs in cloud dashboards as RCE and account-takeover primitives, since a victim's browser triggering privileged actions or reaching a managed identity does the work for you. A shell in your own data plane is the midpoint, not the finish: inventory credentials, connectors, and control-plane calls, then test whether the provider trusted a customer-controlled instance too much. Identity delegation is where the boundaries quietly fail. @albinowax flagged the matching shift in program culture -- programs that used to rage at pivoting now demand it, break in, grab creds, go as far as you can -- and suspects a pile of unpatched high/crit is rotting in closed reports. Meanwhile Google quietly capped the 1.2x Exceptional Quality bonus at $5,000 for post-November-5 reports, a nice 'alignment with impact' that reads more like payout compression when the pivot-or-nothing era is ramping up.
The device-hunting tradecraft worth stealing this week: no UART does not mean no firmware -- pull it straight off the flash chip and let a messy decompile point you somewhere -- and a root shell beats source code every time, because tokens and keys only live in memory at runtime. Devices that phone home are just web targets: rebuild the cloud API and replay it like a JS client to hunt device-to-cloud pivots. Host lists are never as complete as they look, and any check that merely verifies a value appears 'somewhere in a URL' falls over the moment you move that value into a query parameter and point the host somewhere else. Twenty years of broken assumptions, still shipping in firmware. @wunderwuzzi23 banked an Apple bounty for CVE-2026-64750 the same week, a reminder that the quiet researchers keep cashing while the timeline argues about the future.
Your recon tooling is lying to you, and @Jhaddix named the mechanism: automation-detection filters silently swallow requests from curl, wget, Puppeteer, Playwright, and headless Chrome, and your harness gives up without telling you -- roll your own requester or you're crawling a hallucinated target. @NahamSec nearly ate the same lesson from the other direction, burning a session fixated on internal host and metadata endpoints while the actual bounty sat elsewhere; metadata envy is not a methodology. On the tooling side, Caido v0.59.0 shipped precise capture scoping -- Intercept > Capture now splits All traffic, In-scope only, and custom rules into Capture and Passthrough host lists -- which is exactly the hygiene you want when you're recording other people's tokens. Tight release. Worth the upgrade.
Proof the primitives still land on real targets: XBOW disclosed an unauthenticated RCE in a U.S. Election Assistance Commission voting resource calculator -- reverse-engineered frontend JavaScript, attack path followed end to end, code execution as root inside the backend container, patched before November 3. No 'isolated demo instance' spin available on that one. @DanielMiessler also pointed at Dawn Song's team's patch-to-exploit work, the discipline of turning a diff into a weapon, which pairs neatly with the Alpine OpenSSH bypass and a single run that patched 948 Linux kernel bugs now sitting in the newsletter queue. Closing hunting angle for you: grab the Codex sandbox-escape writeup and the EAC frontend-reversing path, diff them against every tool that executes 'untrusted' task content next to your secrets, and assume the detection filters ate your last three scans.
Researcher @0xLupin claims a big-company CEO invited an attack and that he has already found multiple backdoor routes overnight, still hunting a 'giga crit' -- read as unverified red-team chatter, not a disclosed bug.
The CEO of a pretty big company challenged me to hack them and right now pulling an all nighter hacking. Already found different ways to backdoor them but I won't stop until there is a giga crit. Will report back. It's fun coming back to some old school hacking <3
Off-topic tweet (Miessler) about workplace-policy politics and firing rationale; no vulnerability class, exploit primitive or RF/security takeaway to extract.
I’m surprised decent people keep making these “rich men gunna do rich men things” arguments. Let’s explore what this would actually mean. Jensen seems to have been fired because it is against company policy to sleep with employees who are under your influence. This is an extremely common policy across most companies today, and it’s a rule that applies to everyone. Or at least it’s supposed to. The proposal here, if you think about it for just a minute, is to let successful men break rules in accordance with how successful they are. Cool. So HR will have a new system with rule violations on one side, and company value milestones on the other side of the board. So if you’re some mid-level manager at a paper distribution company then you probably shouldn’t sleep with your direct reports because that’s super unethical. …… unless you land that big office supply deal with Walmart this quarter....
Pointer to Dawn Song's team work on turning a patch diff into a working exploit -- patch-to-exploit automation is the takeaway, no CVE or code drop in the excerpt.
Takeaway: the shift isn't novel vulns but lowered skill floor, citing FBI reporting on attackers using Artex to run intrusion tooling; mass-accessibility, not mass-0day.
This is what I’ve been saying would be the problem all along. It’s not about new vulns. It’s about making attacks easy, so a lot more people/groups can do them well enough. https://cybersecuritynews.com/fbi-reveals-hackers-artex-ai-usage/
Agentic offense compresses ops tempo to 2-25 second bursts, so detection/response has to be pre-staged -- no human in the loop can decide live, per Elastic Security Labs' Artex writeup.
I think the real shift is tempo. When an agent acts in two to 25 second bursts, you have to have your defenses ready to go before the incident, because no human will be fast enough to decide them live. https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex
IoT bug-hunting field tips: no UART doesn't mean no firmware -- yank the flash chip and decompile; a runtime root shell beats source since keys/tokens often live only in memory.
Here are some tips from episode 199 on finding IoT bugs: - No UART doesn't mean no firmware, we can just pull it off the flash chip, and even a messy decompile gives AI enough to start RE (go for whatever comes off easiest) - A root shell beats source code, tokens and keys often only live in memory at runtime, so that's where we go dig them up. Of course source code is important, but if you can't get it right now, that's not the end of the world - Devices that ping home are basically web targets, try to rebuild the cloud API and replay it like a JS client to hunt device-to-cloud pivots - Host lists are almost never as complete as they look, since weird internal domains don't always follow the vendor's naming - Checks that only make sure a value shows up somewhere in a URL might get fooled if we stick that value in a query parameter and point the host somewhere else... - If we can make a ...
Kettle flags a triage gap: high/crit bugs sit unpatched inside closed or ignored reports, while pivoting from an initial finding to escalate impact is now expected by some programs.
Personally I love pivoting because it makes conference case-studies more entertaining but I suspect there's a bunch of unpatched high/crit stuck in closed/ignored reports.
.@monkehack is coming to NahamCon with “Weird Ways to Hack Gemini.” Ciarán is a bug bounty hunter, and I’m curious to see what made these hacks get labed as "weird". 👀 He takes the stage November 21 in Oakland. Watch the talk live from anywhere at https://youtube.com/NahamSec.
Kettle notes a shift: programs that once rejected pivoting now require breaking in, grabbing creds, and pivoting as far as possible -- deeper access chains become the expected impact story.
I'm seeing this too. A few years ago you'd get angry programs if you even thought about pivoting with a finding. Now it seems like some of them require you to break in, grab creds & pivot as far as possible.
No technical detail -- a user endorsement of a product announcement and intent to swap note-taking tools; nothing on vuln classes or exploit primitives.
One week until the #Prompt2Pwn CTF. 🚩 It starts Nov 19 at noon PT and runs for 48 hours: 30+ challenges and $5,000+ in prizes. Get your team ready: https://p2p.nahamcon.com/
Really happy with how my new Router system works in LifeOS. It's Opus 5.5 by default but it knows to go up to Fable for things that require high intelligence or scrutiny, like security decisions... And it can decide to use any of my other models in the harness as well.
Tweet is only a v9.x release teaser for the OurLifeOS service; no vulnerability, exploit primitive, or RF detail is included, so there is nothing actionable yet.
I think these are bad comparisons. All of those are powerful tools. They are not agents. This is too extreme, but a better metaphor: - Hacking tools are machine guns - Malicious AI is a Thanos Guantlet If you tell a machine gun to take over a city or carry out a coup, it won’t do anything because it’s a machine gun. If you snap your fingers with a Thanos Gauntlet, saying “disrupt the power grid”, shit happens. Yes, they are both tools and they are both weapons. But there are nowhere near the same thing.
Claim is economic, not technical: sustained bug-bounty income depends on pipeline volume, triage speed, and target selection; no vulnerability class or exploit primitive is named.
Critical Research Lab call for novel security research; submissions are individually reviewed by named handlers, making it a disclosure/presentation channel rather than a technical finding.
What are you up to? If you’ve got some really good research that you want to share with the Critical Thinking community, send it our way! (= If it’s cool, novel research, we’d love to share it on our Critical Research Lab. Each submission is individually reviewed by @J0R1AN, @7urb01, @Yujilik, and @busf4ctor Read about how to submit yours here: https://lab.ctbb.show/submit/
NahamCon2026 talk covers automating device-hacking workflows against embedded targets; the useful angle is orchestration of recon, firmware extraction, and exploit triage across hardware.
Matt Brown (@nmatt0) is bringing device hacking to the #NahamCon2026 stage. His talk, “Clankers vs Clankers: Using LLMs to Automate Device Hacking,” takes on a question I want to see tested: how far can LLMs take device hacking? Watch live 👉🏼 https://youtube.com/NahamSec.
DEFCON data-duplication village focuses on cloning, imaging, and recovering data from devices and media; expect hardware teardown, chip-off, and forensic duplication workflows rather than network exploitation.
Critical unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing U.S. EAC application: frontend JavaScript was reverse-engineered to map the attack path, ending in root code execution inside the backend container.
Thanks to our sponsor this week @Xbow! We just finished the midterms in the USA so, this is relevant: XBOW’s autonomous AI agents discovered a Critical, unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing application belonging to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). The agents reverse-engineered frontend JavaScript, followed the attack path, and proved code execution as root inside the backend container. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed ahead of the November 3 election. Wild! Read the detailed write-up: https://xbow.com/labs/research/how-xbow-found-a-critical-rce-in-an-eac-voting-resource-calculator
HackerNotes for episode 200 maps cloud research from architecture first -- data-plane to control-plane identity links, client-side RCE, and identity confusion bugs.
HackerNotes TLDR for episode 200 https://blog.criticalthinkingpodcast.io/p/hackernotes-ep-200-cloud-hacking-from-the-data-plane-client-side-rce-and-identity-confusion-with-7ur 7urb0 is back for an amazing episode! ►⠀Cloud research starts with architecture. Before testing endpoints, understand what the service provisions, where customer code runs, and which identities connect the data plane to the control plane. ►⠀Client-side bugs in cloud dashboards and deployed service instances can become RCE or account takeover when the victim's browser can trigger privileged actions or reach a managed identity. ►⠀A shell in your own data plane is not the end of the test. Inventory credentials, binaries, network access, connectors, and control-plane calls, then test whether the provider trusted a customer-controlled instance too much. ►⠀Identity delegation is where many cloud boundaries quietly fail. ...
On episode 200 we brought @7urb01 to talk about cloud hacking, client-side RCE, and some interesting identity confusion bugs. Check it out! https://youtu.be/5XrJSSBfGow
Haddix predicts labs will acquire small-to-medium cyber consultancies for proprietary harnesses, synthetic datasets, and deep vulnerability-class expertise.
Prediction: after underwhelming output from from the “frontier of the frontier” models on real world cyber capabilities, the labs, in order to fulfill promises on those capabilities, will begin acquiring small to medium cyber consultancies. They will do this to build more internal tooling (proprietary harnesses), synthetic data sets, and to harvest expertise in deeper level bugs in all vulnerability classes across all domains of assessment (with more focus on deeper level bugs and chained exploits).
Miessler moved his primary terminal stack to Rex and wrote a custom iOS client after an invite email delivery failure; tooling-autonomy note, no security primitive.
I've switched over to Rex as my primary terminal and AI system. So no more Kitty, Ghostty, Herdr, or any of that. But I was having trouble getting an invite to the iOS app (email delivery issue). So I just made my own client. I just make my own software now.
Keep going!!!! Bug bounty gives companies access to findings via subsidized tokens rather than them paying full api costs. And even when they run hacking agents internally, they don’t know for sure if it’s reachable externally. If you get a bug bounty report, you have proof an external actor can exploit the bug. And you didn’t have to pay api token costs to get it either.
.@busf4ctor and Rafael Santos are talking hacking agents at #NahamCon2026: “From Vibes to Vulns: Building Hacking Agents That Don’t Get Lost.” Watch live Nov 20: https://youtube.com/NahamSec
Unverified claim of a release-pipeline backdoor chain for Codex; operational takeaway is verify build signing, dependency pinning, and artifact attestation before shipping.
We managed to find a way to backdoor the next release of OpenAI Codex 🔥 This is the best exploit chain I’ve ever witnessed https://depi.security/blog/20261111-backdooring-codex/
I have a new concept I call The Bitter Wall. - The Bitter Lesson tells us to stop micromanaging AI - Basically: let smarter AI figure out the steps - But there's a limit to this - The output can only be as good as our articulation of what we want https://danielmiessler.com/blog/bitter-wall
Conference wrap-up covering bug-hunting collaborations, security education, and speedrun events; no CVE, exploit primitive, or technical detail in excerpt.
🎬 That’s a wrap on ESCAL8 2026! 🇸🇬✨ Our annual flagship security conference has officially concluded in Singapore. From deep-dive vulnerability research to shaping the future of security talent, it was an unforgettable week of learning, hacking, and collaboration. Catch all the highlights, including:🐞 elite bug hunting & research collaborations, 🛡️ next-generation cybersecurity education, and 🚩 high-stakes, speedrun CTF action from the Hackceler8 arena. Dive in now! 👇🔗 Aftermovie: https://youtu.be/5wcO_Vq86fM Blog post: https://bughunters.google.com/blog/thats-a-wrap-on-escal8-2026 #ESCAL8 #GoogleCTF #Hackceler8 #bugSWAT #GoogleSingapore #CyberSecurity
Injection-to-sandbox-escape chain leading to secret exfiltration and a software supply-chain compromise; six-month research effort against a major platform.
Prompt injection → sandbox escape → secret exfiltration → OpenAI’s software supply chain. Turns out giving @0xMadder and @_Worty six months to break things was a good idea 👾 Very proud of this one. Go read what they found 👇
Thanks for telling me the part most people skip. But the part that I skip when I see that sentence is the rest of whatever you were going to say. It’s the number one AI tell right now.
.@caseyjohnellis is taking the #NahamCon2026 keynote stage with “BBP and VDP 2027: The Great Uncookening.” Where do bug bounty and disclosure programs go next? Watch live Nov 20: https://youtube.com/NahamSec
Caido v0.59.0 gives you precise control over what gets recorded. Under Intercept > Capture, choose All traffic, In-scope only, or set Custom rules to separate hosts into Capture and Passthrough lists. Release notes: https://cai.do/36z
Consultants told to avoid automated tooling on engagements are likely still using it -- assume tool fingerprints and generated prose surface in client deliverables and scope docs accordingly.
Capability milestone dates say nothing about integration time -- the lag between a breakthrough and shipping it into real-world infrastructure is the constraint that actually matters for defenders.
Just a reminder for people who are freaking out about the AI takeover stuff in 2027... Whenever we get RSI or ASI or whatever milestone you care about, that's one date...but it's not the only date that matters. It doesn't say anything about the integration time for getting that tech into the actual world. My friends and I have been doing AGI-adjacent stuff for years already, and yet there are companies still refusing to use AI, or only using it as a chatbot. No matter how big of a jump we see in 2027, dispersion will still take time.
Bare prediction that 2027 is the 'takeoff year', offered with no supporting mechanism -- treat as a forecast timestamp, not evidence, and keep an eye on what would falsify it.
Bare link drop to a post on measuring the pace of development; the feed gives no text, so the claims inside stay unverified until you read the source yourself.
Self-reported numbers from that post: internal agents leading ~26% of R&D work (under 1% in February), 90%+ collaboration, ~30k agents running, a billion decisions -- vendor metrics, diff against independent benchmarks.
This post by Anthropic is massively overlooked, and these are my biggest takeaways: - Claude now leads 26% of Anthropic's AI R&D work. In February it was under 1% - AI collaborates on or leads over 90% of that R&D work. In August 2025, going by the chart, it was about 4% - About 30,000 AI agents do research and engineering at Anthropic at any one time (on one platform) - Those agents made over a billion decisions in one month. 1 in 47,000 got blocked - Monitors flag ~100,000 agent transcripts a week, and only ~50 reach a human - To build the index, Claude agents read staff Slack and docs and mapped 15,000 R&D tasks - Claude agreed with humans more often than humans agreed with each other (59% vs 35%) - Agents get their own identities that survive model upgrades. They coordinate on an open message board, so they can check each other's work https://www.anthropic.com/institute/measuring-pac...
Refusal-stripped variants finishing IoT pentest benchmark tasks 2-3x faster than stock builds on identical hardware -- worth re-running your own suite before writing them off on refusal behavior alone.
I too have been basing my dismissal of abliterated models off the regular models lack of refusals. This post from @Jhaddix made me go back and actually test. I think he is on to something. In some IoT pentest benchmarks of mine, abliterated GLM 5.3 Flash is finishing the task 2-3x times faster on the same hardware. Running my full benchmark setup now. This could be big.
Biggest live hacking event of the year. 🔥 #Prompt2Pwn hits Oakland Nov 20–21. Live targets: OpenAI, Vercel, Dropbox & Meta. Plus 12 NahamCon talks and a 48-hour CTF (Nov 19–21) with 30+ challenges and $5K+ in prizes. Apply: https://forms.gle/x8YhgLnGis4F1FjB9
Google and Cloud VRP cap the 1.2x Exceptional Quality bonus at $5,000 for reports after Nov 5; the 1.2x multiplier still applies to base rewards up to $25k.
Hey bug hunters! 👋 As part of our regular program updates to better align rewards with impact, we’ve updated the 1.2x Exceptional Quality bonus across the Google & Cloud VRPs with a $5,000 cap on reports submitted after Nov 5th. The full 1.2x multiplier remains unchanged for all base rewards up to $25k. Check out the updated rules here: https://bughunters.google.com/about/rules/google-friends/cloud-vulnerability-reward-program-rules#report-quality https://bughunters.google.com/about/rules/google-friends/google-and-alphabet-vulnerability-reward-program-vrp-rules#report-quality
Product-security takeaway: compliance alone is not enough; trustworthy devices require engineers fixing defects instead of burning cycles on endless triage.
Firmware teardown takeaway: SBOMs rarely match shipped binaries; expect leftover dev artifacts, debug access, and decade-old CVEs in cameras, routers, and IoT gear.
5/ I've torn open enough cameras, routers, and IoT gear to know the SBOM and the actual binary almost never match. I constantly find development artifacts, debug access, and CVEs a decade old. This is the work that has to happen before devices reach shelves. #ad https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20261110251092/en/Finite-State-Raises-%2427-Million-to-Help-Device-Makers-Fight-the-Vulnpocalypse-with-AI-Powered-Product-Security?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark
FiniteStateInc raised a $27M Series C to scale pre-shelf product-security review for device makers, targeting vulnerability backlogs before hardware reaches shelves.
1/ Big news in product security: @FiniteStateInc raised a $27M Series C, led by The O.H.I.O. Fund, to help device makers fight the Vulnpocalypse. Here's why I think it matters.
A new #Prompt2Pwn CTF mission is coming, thanks to @pdiscoveryio. Your only hint for now: GTA. 👀 The CTF starts Nov 19 at noon PT: 48 hours, 30+ challenges, $5,000+ in prizes. Details: https://p2p.nahamcon.com/
Reminder that anti-bot stacks silently block curl/wget/Puppeteer/Playwright fetches -- when the hackbot's sub-agent goes quiet, roll your own HTTP requester and check the response codes.
Anti bot mitigations block: Web fetch Curl Wget Puppeteer Playwright Chrome devtools mcp You don’t notice because it’s in a sub agent and your hackbot gives up silently. Roll your own requester.
SELinux frustration from an offensive researcher -- getting payloads, services or bind-mounted tooling past enforcing mode is a recurring friction point; flip to permissive to diff out the denial.
Eval-harness take: a mature harness with high enforced standards absorbs new model gains slowly, so flat eval deltas can mean your harness is already doing the heavy lifting.
One way to tell if you have a really good harness / system is if it takes longer for you to see the improvements from new models. If you already have high standards that are represented and enforced in your evals, model improvements are more subtle. @poteto @mattpocockuk
Sponsored pitch arguing SOC alert fatigue is a headcount problem, not a tooling one -- sketch is automated triage plus takedown of phishing/impersonation infrastructure, so read it as vendor framing rather than a primitive.
Thanks to our sponsor Doppel: why more headcount won't fix SOC alert fatigue, and how they automate triage and takedown. https://ul.live/doppel_n550?utm_source=newsletter.danielmiessler.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=unsupervised-learning-no-550
70 marketplace-published AI skills bundled Atomic macOS Stealer installers yet passed a popular marketplace's 'secure' rating -- supply-chain poisoning of agent/skill registries where review never touches the payload.
Thanks to our sponsor Cyera: their research found 70 AI skills built to install Atomic macOS Stealer, all rated secure by a popular marketplace. https://ul.live/cyera_n550?utm_source=newsletter.danielmiessler.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=unsupervised-learning-no-550
Newsletter roundup with one item worth pulling: an Alpine OpenSSH bypass -- poking at musl/Alpine builds to see where auth paths diverge from glibc distros.
Unsupervised Learning NO. 550 is out. ⚡ My new Vim distro, ULVim. It starts in 63ms. 📉 The Bitter Lesson, generalized 🪙 How North Korea went after $6.34B at Binance 🐧 One OpenAI run patched 948 Linux kernel bugs 💤 Agents that "dream" remember better Plus the Alpine OpenSSH bypass, Ukraine's missile gap, Gen Z's AI-on-AI job search, and more. https://newsletter.danielmiessler.com/p/unsupervised-learning-no-550
🚨 Fable 5.2 is out! - Massive benchmark jumps - Remote Labor Index: 41.3%, nearly double Opus 5.5's 21.3% - Cheaper than 5.1 (10/50->8/40) - Up to 30% faster, plus a fast mode up to 2.5x https://www.anthropic.com/claude-fable-and-mythos-5-2
As lower model versions are retired and higher ones replace them at similar costs, general AI safety will increase for organizations developing AI powered features. Agent control though, because it’s nuanced and no one has solved sandboxing, will still be a huge attack vector. Most real world attacks we’re pulling off these days require a mixture of skills: prompt injection, web pentesting, lpe, sandbox escape/exfil. Time to become multi dimensional fam 🫶 The AI Assessment world isn’t Gandalf level anymore.
CSS injection as a real exfil primitive: attribute-selector leak of input values, plus data exfil via background-image and @font-face, all without touching the JS sink.
Agent-hacking notes: never trust an agent's 'it's safe' verdict, since long runs anchor on one idea -- restart with the prior notes for a second opinion, and feed spec plus implementation together for weird binary protocols.
Here are some tips from episode 199 on hacking with AI agents! - An agent saying something is safe or unhackable shouldn't be the end of it, long-running agents get stuck on one idea. We can spin up a fresh one, hand it the first one's notes and ask if it agrees... Or just check it yourself, stop being lazy! - Weird binary protocols get way less scary if we give it the spec and the implementation side by side, since it probably knows the spec better than we do and the differences are where the bugs hide, so we can use human reasoning on the comparison the AI made - "Find all the bugs" and such usually brings garbage, so a narrow job works better. Go narrow - Telling it how we think something works and asking it to confirm or deny beats asking for answers, since that's how we actually learn the architecture and start pointing it at the right spots - Short dupe windows reward speed more th...
Throwaway jab at Linux/OSS governance friction -- no technical payload, but maintainer burnout and slow patch turnaround are the real bug class behind most of that drama.
Reminder from a bounty run: internal host and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) still pay -- keep probing them by hand instead of trusting the assistant to surface them.
Caido v0.59.0 bolts on workflow generation from a plain-language description -- connect a backend, inspect/edit the generated nodes, then run passive, active or convert flows.
Caido v0.59.0 is out 👌 You can now generate Workflows from a prompt. Connect an AI provider, describe what you need, and inspect or edit the generated nodes before running them. Whether you need passive, active or convert Workflow! All are in. Changelog: https://cai.do/36z
Containers are not cross-platform in practice -- syscall, cgroup and namespace differences between Linux/macOS/Windows kernels will break security tooling that assumes one runtime.
Benchmark leaderboard disagreement: an aggregator's table and a personal ordering diverge hard -- check the harness and task set before trusting any single ranking, they are easy to game.
How are these metrics from Artificial Analysis so strange? @theo: Sol, Terra, Sonnet, and Muse above Fable 5.1? They go: 1️⃣ Opus 2️⃣ Astra 3️⃣ Sol 4️⃣ Sonnet 5️⃣ Terra 6️⃣ Argon 7️⃣ Fable !!!! Here are my rankings: 1️⃣ Opus 2️⃣ Fable 3️⃣ Astra 4️⃣ Sol 5️⃣ Sonnet Which matches you?
Miessler pushes thebenchmarks.ai, arguing researchers should publish benchmarks built from their own real task workloads instead of borrowed synthetic evals -- useful frame for measuring exploit-dev and recon pipelines against repeatable work.
https://thebenchmarks.ai (Inspired by @theo's version) I'd really like to see more people posting their own benchmarks based on the REAL WORK that they do.
Miessler's read: Jensen Huang is effectively inseparable from NVIDIA, so any 'he gets replaced' speculation is noise -- leadership-concentration risk rather than anything technical.
Miessler's blog post argues vibe coding is not the same as using AI to code -- the distinction being whether you actually understand what the generated code does before it ships.
Miessler concedes early builders can gain from messing around, but wants engineering judgment and architecture/security understanding kept human -- AI fills in the implementation inside those bounds.
And this is not to say that it's always bad. I think there can be some value in early builders just messing around with it. But ultimately, I think people should be doing engineering with their own taste and preferences and deep understanding of how they implement important things like architecture and security and stuff like that. The AI should basically be doing all the work for you, but within those confines.
Miessler's definition: vibe coding is shipping AI output with no idea what it did -- separation from understanding, the opposite of engineering; a fairness check when auditing AI-assisted exploit or tooling code.
Here's how I captured this: Vibe Coding isn't using AI to code. Vibe Coding is when you have no idea what your AI is making for you. It's separation from understanding. The opposite of engineering. https://danielmiessler.com/blog/vibe-coding-isnt-using-ai
Haddix and xssdoctor report abliterated models sharply change offensive-security chain-of-thought: normal models burn a big chunk of tokens arguing task validity, safety and scope, killing pentest and bounty outcomes.
I (and @xssdoctor) were just talking about our experiences the other day, for bounty and pentest work. We have the opposite experience. Running Abliterated models drastically changes offsec CoT and hence outcomes for cyber testing. If you watch your chain of thought in a normal model, you’ll notice it taking a significant portion of your inference or tokens to argue about the tasks validity, safety, scope, and system prompt directives. PAGES of garbage reasoning polluting your attention mechanism for the transformer. It may get to “ok, I’ll do it” but you’ve wasted time, attention, and tokens, and have context pollution for future generations. Abliterated models don’t do this. That and they also have the latent space to ideate and find solutions to things a normal model won’t.
Subscriber-only Hardware Hackalong session; operational takeaway is live hardware tear-down and collaboration, with no vulnerability details in the excerpt.
Intigriti CrowdRecon pays researchers for recon data even without a confirmed bug; shifts bounty value toward asset discovery and attack-surface mapping.
Here's a new way to make money in bug bounty: Intigriti's CrowdRecon pays researchers for their recon data on targets. Even if you haven't found a bug, you can still put that data to some good use! (= Join the waitlist here: https://www.criticalthinkingpodcast.io/Intigriti-CrowdRecon
The CEO of a pretty big company challenged me to hack them and right now pulling an all nighter hacking. Already found different ways to bac...
[ notes ] Researcher @0xLupin claims a big-company CEO invited an attack and that he has already found multiple backdoor routes overnight, still hunting a 'giga crit' -- read as unverified red-team chatter, not a disclosed bug.
[ source excerpt ] The CEO of a pretty big company challenged me to hack them and right now pulling an all nighter hacking. Already found different ways to backdoor them but I won't stop until there is a giga crit. Will report back. It's fun coming back to some old school hacking <3
I’m surprised decent people keep making these “rich men gunna do rich men things” arguments. Let’s explore what this would actually mean. Je...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-14 17:23 UTC
[ notes ] Off-topic tweet (Miessler) about workplace-policy politics and firing rationale; no vulnerability class, exploit primitive or RF/security takeaway to extract.
[ source excerpt ] I’m surprised decent people keep making these “rich men gunna do rich men things” arguments. Let’s explore what this would actually mean. Jensen seems to have been fired because it is against company policy to sleep with employees who are under your influence. This is an extremely common policy across most companies today, and it’s a rule that applies to everyone. Or at least it’s supposed to. The proposal here, if you think about it for just a minute, is to let successful men break rules in accordance with how successful they are. Cool. So HR will have a new system with rule violations on one side, and company value milestones on the other side of the board. So if you’re some mid-level manager at a paper distribution company then you probably shouldn’t sleep with your direct reports because that’s super unethical. …… unless you land that big office supply deal with Walmart this quarter....
Really cool work by @dawnsongtweets and team about going from a patch to an exploit.
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-14 16:29 UTC
[ notes ] Pointer to Dawn Song's team work on turning a patch diff into a working exploit -- patch-to-exploit automation is the takeaway, no CVE or code drop in the excerpt.
[ source excerpt ] Really cool work by @dawnsongtweets and team about going from a patch to an exploit.
This is what I’ve been saying would be the problem all along. It’s not about new vulns. It’s about making attacks easy, so a lot more people...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-14 16:26 UTC
[ notes ] Takeaway: the shift isn't novel vulns but lowered skill floor, citing FBI reporting on attackers using Artex to run intrusion tooling; mass-accessibility, not mass-0day.
[ source excerpt ] This is what I’ve been saying would be the problem all along. It’s not about new vulns. It’s about making attacks easy, so a lot more people/groups can do them well enough. https://cybersecuritynews.com/fbi-reveals-hackers-artex-ai-usage/
I think the real shift is tempo. When an agent acts in two to 25 second bursts, you have to have your defenses ready to go before the incide...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-14 06:16 UTC
[ notes ] Agentic offense compresses ops tempo to 2-25 second bursts, so detection/response has to be pre-staged -- no human in the loop can decide live, per Elastic Security Labs' Artex writeup.
[ source excerpt ] I think the real shift is tempo. When an agent acts in two to 25 second bursts, you have to have your defenses ready to go before the incident, because no human will be fast enough to decide them live. https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex
Here are some tips from episode 199 on finding IoT bugs: - No UART doesn't mean no firmware, we can just pull it off the flash chip, and eve...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-13 15:45 UTC
[ notes ] IoT bug-hunting field tips: no UART doesn't mean no firmware -- yank the flash chip and decompile; a runtime root shell beats source since keys/tokens often live only in memory.
[ source excerpt ] Here are some tips from episode 199 on finding IoT bugs: - No UART doesn't mean no firmware, we can just pull it off the flash chip, and even a messy decompile gives AI enough to start RE (go for whatever comes off easiest) - A root shell beats source code, tokens and keys often only live in memory at runtime, so that's where we go dig them up. Of course source code is important, but if you can't get it right now, that's not the end of the world - Devices that ping home are basically web targets, try to rebuild the cloud API and replay it like a JS client to hunt device-to-cloud pivots - Host lists are almost never as complete as they look, since weird internal domains don't always follow the vendor's naming - Checks that only make sure a value shows up somewhere in a URL might get fooled if we stick that value in a query parameter and point the host somewhere else... - If we can make a ...
Personally I love pivoting because it makes conference case-studies more entertaining but I suspect there's a bunch of unpatched high/crit s...
source: James Kettle (@albinowax) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-13 15:41 UTC
[ notes ] Kettle flags a triage gap: high/crit bugs sit unpatched inside closed or ignored reports, while pivoting from an initial finding to escalate impact is now expected by some programs.
[ source excerpt ] Personally I love pivoting because it makes conference case-studies more entertaining but I suspect there's a bunch of unpatched high/crit stuck in closed/ignored reports.
.@monkehack is coming to NahamCon with “Weird Ways to Hack Gemini.” Ciarán is a bug bounty hunter, and I’m curious to see what made these ha...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-13 14:21 UTC
[ notes ] Talk teaser on unusual bug-bounty abuse paths against a hosted service; no payload detail, just a Nov 21 NahamCon stage slot and livestream link.
[ source excerpt ] .@monkehack is coming to NahamCon with “Weird Ways to Hack Gemini.” Ciarán is a bug bounty hunter, and I’m curious to see what made these hacks get labed as "weird". 👀 He takes the stage November 21 in Oakland. Watch the talk live from anywhere at https://youtube.com/NahamSec.
I'm seeing this too. A few years ago you'd get angry programs if you even thought about pivoting with a finding. Now it seems like some of t...
source: James Kettle (@albinowax) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-13 13:30 UTC
[ notes ] Kettle notes a shift: programs that once rejected pivoting now require breaking in, grabbing creds, and pivoting as far as possible -- deeper access chains become the expected impact story.
[ source excerpt ] I'm seeing this too. A few years ago you'd get angry programs if you even thought about pivoting with a finding. Now it seems like some of them require you to break in, grab creds & pivot as far as possible.
I don’t normally pay attention to the “Claude for X” announcements. But this one is big. Setting it up immediately to replace Granola.
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 21:07 UTC
[ notes ] No technical detail -- a user endorsement of a product announcement and intent to swap note-taking tools; nothing on vuln classes or exploit primitives.
[ source excerpt ] I don’t normally pay attention to the “Claude for X” announcements. But this one is big. Setting it up immediately to replace Granola.
One week until the #Prompt2Pwn CTF. 🚩 It starts Nov 19 at noon PT and runs for 48 hours: 30+ challenges and $5,000+ in prizes. Get your team...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 21:00 UTC
[ notes ] NahamCon CTF runs Nov 19 noon PT for 48 hours, 30+ challenges, $5k+ prizes; no challenge categories or vuln classes disclosed in the teaser.
[ source excerpt ] One week until the #Prompt2Pwn CTF. 🚩 It starts Nov 19 at noon PT and runs for 48 hours: 30+ challenges and $5,000+ in prizes. Get your team ready: https://p2p.nahamcon.com/
Really happy with how my new Router system works in LifeOS. It's Opus 5.5 by default but it knows to go up to Fable for things that require ...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 20:23 UTC
[ notes ] No security content -- a personal tool-routing setup that escalates tasks for scrutiny; no vulnerability class, primitive, or field takeaway.
[ source excerpt ] Really happy with how my new Router system works in LifeOS. It's Opus 5.5 by default but it knows to go up to Fable for things that require high intelligence or scrutiny, like security decisions... And it can decide to use any of my other models in the harness as well.
Version 9.x shipping soon with this included. https://ourlifeos.ai
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 20:23 UTC
[ notes ] Tweet is only a v9.x release teaser for the OurLifeOS service; no vulnerability, exploit primitive, or RF detail is included, so there is nothing actionable yet.
[ source excerpt ] Version 9.x shipping soon with this included. https://ourlifeos.ai
I think these are bad comparisons. All of those are powerful tools. They are not agents. This is too extreme, but a better metaphor: - Hacki...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 19:13 UTC
[ notes ] No technical detail -- a weapons metaphor about tooling vs a magic gauntlet; no CVE, vuln class, or exploit primitive.
[ source excerpt ] I think these are bad comparisons. All of those are powerful tools. They are not agents. This is too extreme, but a better metaphor: - Hacking tools are machine guns - Malicious AI is a Thanos Guantlet If you tell a machine gun to take over a city or carry out a coup, it won’t do anything because it’s a machine gun. If you snap your fingers with a Thanos Gauntlet, saying “disrupt the power grid”, shit happens. Yes, they are both tools and they are both weapons. But there are nowhere near the same thing.
cool, even got a bounty for this one from apple 😀 CVE-2026-64750
source: Johann Rehberger (@wunderwuzzi23) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 18:41 UTC
[ notes ] Rehberger reports an Apple bounty tied to CVE-2026-64750; no technical detail in the post on the vuln class, affected component, or exploit primitive.
[ source excerpt ] cool, even got a bounty for this one from apple 😀 CVE-2026-64750
Bug bounty is still 80%+ profit if you're a dedicated hacker
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-12 16:32 UTC
[ notes ] Claim is economic, not technical: sustained bug-bounty income depends on pipeline volume, triage speed, and target selection; no vulnerability class or exploit primitive is named.
[ source excerpt ] Bug bounty is still 80%+ profit if you're a dedicated hacker
What are you up to? If you’ve got some really good research that you want to share with the Critical Thinking community, send it our way! (=...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-12 16:26 UTC
[ notes ] Critical Research Lab call for novel security research; submissions are individually reviewed by named handlers, making it a disclosure/presentation channel rather than a technical finding.
[ source excerpt ] What are you up to? If you’ve got some really good research that you want to share with the Critical Thinking community, send it our way! (= If it’s cool, novel research, we’d love to share it on our Critical Research Lab. Each submission is individually reviewed by @J0R1AN, @7urb01, @Yujilik, and @busf4ctor Read about how to submit yours here: https://lab.ctbb.show/submit/
Matt Brown (@nmatt0) is bringing device hacking to the #NahamCon2026 stage. His talk, “Clankers vs Clankers: Using LLMs to Automate Device H...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 16:00 UTC
[ notes ] NahamCon2026 talk covers automating device-hacking workflows against embedded targets; the useful angle is orchestration of recon, firmware extraction, and exploit triage across hardware.
[ source excerpt ] Matt Brown (@nmatt0) is bringing device hacking to the #NahamCon2026 stage. His talk, “Clankers vs Clankers: Using LLMs to Automate Device Hacking,” takes on a question I want to see tested: how far can LLMs take device hacking? Watch live 👉🏼 https://youtube.com/NahamSec.
DEFCON's data duplication village is going to be hoppin next year.
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 15:53 UTC
[ notes ] DEFCON data-duplication village focuses on cloning, imaging, and recovering data from devices and media; expect hardware teardown, chip-off, and forensic duplication workflows rather than network exploitation.
[ source excerpt ] DEFCON's data duplication village is going to be hoppin next year.
Thanks to our sponsor this week @Xbow! We just finished the midterms in the USA so, this is relevant: XBOW’s autonomous AI agents discovered...
source: Jason Haddix (@Jhaddix) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 15:41 UTC
[ notes ] Critical unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing U.S. EAC application: frontend JavaScript was reverse-engineered to map the attack path, ending in root code execution inside the backend container.
[ source excerpt ] Thanks to our sponsor this week @Xbow! We just finished the midterms in the USA so, this is relevant: XBOW’s autonomous AI agents discovered a Critical, unauthenticated RCE in a public-facing application belonging to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). The agents reverse-engineered frontend JavaScript, followed the attack path, and proved code execution as root inside the backend container. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed ahead of the November 3 election. Wild! Read the detailed write-up: https://xbow.com/labs/research/how-xbow-found-a-critical-rce-in-an-eac-voting-resource-calculator
HackerNotes TLDR for episode 200 https://blog.criticalthinkingpodcast.io/p/hackernotes-ep-200-cloud-hacking-from-the-data-plane-client-side-...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-12 11:03 UTC
[ notes ] HackerNotes for episode 200 maps cloud research from architecture first -- data-plane to control-plane identity links, client-side RCE, and identity confusion bugs.
[ source excerpt ] HackerNotes TLDR for episode 200 https://blog.criticalthinkingpodcast.io/p/hackernotes-ep-200-cloud-hacking-from-the-data-plane-client-side-rce-and-identity-confusion-with-7ur 7urb0 is back for an amazing episode! ►⠀Cloud research starts with architecture. Before testing endpoints, understand what the service provisions, where customer code runs, and which identities connect the data plane to the control plane. ►⠀Client-side bugs in cloud dashboards and deployed service instances can become RCE or account takeover when the victim's browser can trigger privileged actions or reach a managed identity. ►⠀A shell in your own data plane is not the end of the test. Inventory credentials, binaries, network access, connectors, and control-plane calls, then test whether the provider trusted a customer-controlled instance too much. ►⠀Identity delegation is where many cloud boundaries quietly fail. ...
On episode 200 we brought @7urb01 to talk about cloud hacking, client-side RCE, and some interesting identity confusion bugs. Check it out! ...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-12 11:03 UTC
[ notes ] Episode 200 discusses cloud hacking, client-side RCE, and identity-confusion bugs with 7urb01; useful for mapping cloud trust boundaries.
[ source excerpt ] On episode 200 we brought @7urb01 to talk about cloud hacking, client-side RCE, and some interesting identity confusion bugs. Check it out! https://youtu.be/5XrJSSBfGow
Prediction: after underwhelming output from from the “frontier of the frontier” models on real world cyber capabilities, the labs, in order ...
source: Jason Haddix (@Jhaddix) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 01:13 UTC
[ notes ] Haddix predicts labs will acquire small-to-medium cyber consultancies for proprietary harnesses, synthetic datasets, and deep vulnerability-class expertise.
[ source excerpt ] Prediction: after underwhelming output from from the “frontier of the frontier” models on real world cyber capabilities, the labs, in order to fulfill promises on those capabilities, will begin acquiring small to medium cyber consultancies. They will do this to build more internal tooling (proprietary harnesses), synthetic data sets, and to harvest expertise in deeper level bugs in all vulnerability classes across all domains of assessment (with more focus on deeper level bugs and chained exploits).
I've switched over to Rex as my primary terminal and AI system. So no more Kitty, Ghostty, Herdr, or any of that. But I was having trouble g...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-12 01:02 UTC
[ notes ] Miessler moved his primary terminal stack to Rex and wrote a custom iOS client after an invite email delivery failure; tooling-autonomy note, no security primitive.
[ source excerpt ] I've switched over to Rex as my primary terminal and AI system. So no more Kitty, Ghostty, Herdr, or any of that. But I was having trouble getting an invite to the iOS app (email delivery issue). So I just made my own client. I just make my own software now.
[ source excerpt ] Keep going!!!! Bug bounty gives companies access to findings via subsidized tokens rather than them paying full api costs. And even when they run hacking agents internally, they don’t know for sure if it’s reachable externally. If you get a bug bounty report, you have proof an external actor can exploit the bug. And you didn’t have to pay api token costs to get it either.
.@busf4ctor and Rafael Santos are talking hacking agents at #NahamCon2026: “From Vibes to Vulns: Building Hacking Agents That Don’t Get Lost...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 20:11 UTC
[ notes ] NahamCon2026 talk by busf4ctor and Rafael Santos covers building goal-directed hacking tooling that avoids drift; livestream Nov 20 via NahamSec.
[ source excerpt ] .@busf4ctor and Rafael Santos are talking hacking agents at #NahamCon2026: “From Vibes to Vulns: Building Hacking Agents That Don’t Get Lost.” Watch live Nov 20: https://youtube.com/NahamSec
[ notes ] Unverified claim of a release-pipeline backdoor chain for Codex; operational takeaway is verify build signing, dependency pinning, and artifact attestation before shipping.
[ source excerpt ] We managed to find a way to backdoor the next release of OpenAI Codex 🔥 This is the best exploit chain I’ve ever witnessed https://depi.security/blog/20261111-backdooring-codex/
I have a new concept I call The Bitter Wall. - The Bitter Lesson tells us to stop micromanaging AI - Basically: let smarter AI figure out th...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 17:31 UTC
[ notes ] Bitter Wall concept: automation output quality caps at task articulation -- write tight scopes, acceptance tests, and stop conditions for security automation.
[ source excerpt ] I have a new concept I call The Bitter Wall. - The Bitter Lesson tells us to stop micromanaging AI - Basically: let smarter AI figure out the steps - But there's a limit to this - The output can only be as good as our articulation of what we want https://danielmiessler.com/blog/bitter-wall
🎬 That’s a wrap on ESCAL8 2026! 🇸🇬✨ Our annual flagship security conference has officially concluded in Singapore. From deep-dive vulnerabil...
source: Michael Cote & Darby Hopkins (@GoogleVRP) | role: Guests (Google Cloud VRP) | published: 2026-11-11 17:00 UTC
[ notes ] Conference wrap-up covering bug-hunting collaborations, security education, and speedrun events; no CVE, exploit primitive, or technical detail in excerpt.
[ source excerpt ] 🎬 That’s a wrap on ESCAL8 2026! 🇸🇬✨ Our annual flagship security conference has officially concluded in Singapore. From deep-dive vulnerability research to shaping the future of security talent, it was an unforgettable week of learning, hacking, and collaboration. Catch all the highlights, including:🐞 elite bug hunting & research collaborations, 🛡️ next-generation cybersecurity education, and 🚩 high-stakes, speedrun CTF action from the Hackceler8 arena. Dive in now! 👇🔗 Aftermovie: https://youtu.be/5wcO_Vq86fM Blog post: https://bughunters.google.com/blog/thats-a-wrap-on-escal8-2026 #ESCAL8 #GoogleCTF #Hackceler8 #bugSWAT #GoogleSingapore #CyberSecurity
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-11 16:15 UTC
[ notes ] Podcast teaser on making text sound like a target wrote it; treat stylometric spoofing as social-engineering aid and verify authorship out-of-band.
[ source excerpt ] "Make it sound like I wrote this!"
[ notes ] Injection-to-sandbox-escape chain leading to secret exfiltration and a software supply-chain compromise; six-month research effort against a major platform.
[ source excerpt ] Prompt injection → sandbox escape → secret exfiltration → OpenAI’s software supply chain. Turns out giving @0xMadder and @_Worty six months to break things was a good idea 👾 Very proud of this one. Go read what they found 👇
Thanks for telling me the part most people skip. But the part that I skip when I see that sentence is the rest of whatever you were going to...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 14:47 UTC
[ notes ] Writing-style critique of a frequently skipped stock phrase; no vulnerability, exploit primitive, or operational security takeaway.
[ source excerpt ] Thanks for telling me the part most people skip. But the part that I skip when I see that sentence is the rest of whatever you were going to say. It’s the number one AI tell right now.
.@caseyjohnellis is taking the #NahamCon2026 keynote stage with “BBP and VDP 2027: The Great Uncookening.” Where do bug bounty and disclosur...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 14:08 UTC
[ notes ] NahamCon 2026 keynote on the future direction of bug-bounty and vulnerability disclosure programs; no exploit primitive disclosed.
[ source excerpt ] .@caseyjohnellis is taking the #NahamCon2026 keynote stage with “BBP and VDP 2027: The Great Uncookening.” Where do bug bounty and disclosure programs go next? Watch live Nov 20: https://youtube.com/NahamSec
Caido v0.59.0 gives you precise control over what gets recorded. Under Intercept > Capture, choose All traffic, In-scope only, or set Custom...
source: Caido Official (@caidoio) | role: Guest Org (Emile Fugulin) | published: 2026-11-11 13:06 UTC
[ notes ] Caido v0.59.0 adds Intercept > Capture modes -- All traffic, In-scope only, or custom rules splitting hosts into Capture and Passthrough lists.
[ source excerpt ] Caido v0.59.0 gives you precise control over what gets recorded. Under Intercept > Capture, choose All traffic, In-scope only, or set Custom rules to separate hosts into Capture and Passthrough lists. Release notes: https://cai.do/36z
I've got a feeling that a lot of security consultants who are being told not to use LLMs on pentests are, in fact, using LLMs on pentests
source: Sam Curry (@samwcyo) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 05:57 UTC
[ notes ] Consultants told to avoid automated tooling on engagements are likely still using it -- assume tool fingerprints and generated prose surface in client deliverables and scope docs accordingly.
[ source excerpt ] I've got a feeling that a lot of security consultants who are being told not to use LLMs on pentests are, in fact, using LLMs on pentests
Just a reminder for people who are freaking out about the AI takeover stuff in 2027... Whenever we get RSI or ASI or whatever milestone you ...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 01:33 UTC
[ notes ] Capability milestone dates say nothing about integration time -- the lag between a breakthrough and shipping it into real-world infrastructure is the constraint that actually matters for defenders.
[ source excerpt ] Just a reminder for people who are freaking out about the AI takeover stuff in 2027... Whenever we get RSI or ASI or whatever milestone you care about, that's one date...but it's not the only date that matters. It doesn't say anything about the integration time for getting that tech into the actual world. My friends and I have been doing AGI-adjacent stuff for years already, and yet there are companies still refusing to use AI, or only using it as a chatbot. No matter how big of a jump we see in 2027, dispersion will still take time.
It really does look like 2027 is the takeoff year, as so many have been saying.
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 00:54 UTC
[ notes ] Bare prediction that 2027 is the 'takeoff year', offered with no supporting mechanism -- treat as a forecast timestamp, not evidence, and keep an eye on what would falsify it.
[ source excerpt ] It really does look like 2027 is the takeoff year, as so many have been saying.
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 00:53 UTC
[ notes ] Bare link drop to a post on measuring the pace of development; the feed gives no text, so the claims inside stay unverified until you read the source yourself.
This post by Anthropic is massively overlooked, and these are my biggest takeaways: - Claude now leads 26% of Anthropic's AI R&D work. In Fe...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 00:53 UTC
[ notes ] Self-reported numbers from that post: internal agents leading ~26% of R&D work (under 1% in February), 90%+ collaboration, ~30k agents running, a billion decisions -- vendor metrics, diff against independent benchmarks.
[ source excerpt ] This post by Anthropic is massively overlooked, and these are my biggest takeaways: - Claude now leads 26% of Anthropic's AI R&D work. In February it was under 1% - AI collaborates on or leads over 90% of that R&D work. In August 2025, going by the chart, it was about 4% - About 30,000 AI agents do research and engineering at Anthropic at any one time (on one platform) - Those agents made over a billion decisions in one month. 1 in 47,000 got blocked - Monitors flag ~100,000 agent transcripts a week, and only ~50 reach a human - To build the index, Claude agents read staff Slack and docs and mapped 15,000 R&D tasks - Claude agreed with humans more often than humans agreed with each other (59% vs 35%) - Agents get their own identities that survive model upgrades. They coordinate on an open message board, so they can check each other's work https://www.anthropic.com/institute/measuring-pac...
I too have been basing my dismissal of abliterated models off the regular models lack of refusals. This post from @Jhaddix made me go back a...
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-11 00:10 UTC
[ notes ] Refusal-stripped variants finishing IoT pentest benchmark tasks 2-3x faster than stock builds on identical hardware -- worth re-running your own suite before writing them off on refusal behavior alone.
[ source excerpt ] I too have been basing my dismissal of abliterated models off the regular models lack of refusals. This post from @Jhaddix made me go back and actually test. I think he is on to something. In some IoT pentest benchmarks of mine, abliterated GLM 5.3 Flash is finishing the task 2-3x times faster on the same hardware. Running my full benchmark setup now. This could be big.
Biggest live hacking event of the year. 🔥 #Prompt2Pwn hits Oakland Nov 20–21. Live targets: OpenAI, Vercel, Dropbox & Meta. Plus 12 NahamCon...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-10 18:00 UTC
[ notes ] Live hacking event in Oakland Nov 20-21 lists four major web targets plus a 48-hour CTF with 30+ challenges and $5K+ prizes; applications are open.
[ source excerpt ] Biggest live hacking event of the year. 🔥 #Prompt2Pwn hits Oakland Nov 20–21. Live targets: OpenAI, Vercel, Dropbox & Meta. Plus 12 NahamCon talks and a 48-hour CTF (Nov 19–21) with 30+ challenges and $5K+ in prizes. Apply: https://forms.gle/x8YhgLnGis4F1FjB9
Hey bug hunters! 👋 As part of our regular program updates to better align rewards with impact, we’ve updated the 1.2x Exceptional Quality bo...
source: Michael Cote & Darby Hopkins (@GoogleVRP) | role: Guests (Google Cloud VRP) | published: 2026-11-10 17:00 UTC
[ notes ] Google and Cloud VRP cap the 1.2x Exceptional Quality bonus at $5,000 for reports after Nov 5; the 1.2x multiplier still applies to base rewards up to $25k.
[ source excerpt ] Hey bug hunters! 👋 As part of our regular program updates to better align rewards with impact, we’ve updated the 1.2x Exceptional Quality bonus across the Google & Cloud VRPs with a $5,000 cap on reports submitted after Nov 5th. The full 1.2x multiplier remains unchanged for all base rewards up to $25k. Check out the updated rules here: https://bughunters.google.com/about/rules/google-friends/cloud-vulnerability-reward-program-rules#report-quality https://bughunters.google.com/about/rules/google-friends/google-and-alphabet-vulnerability-reward-program-vrp-rules#report-quality
4/ The goal is bigger than compliance: devices people can actually trust, and engineers who get to spend their time building instead of tria...
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-10 14:47 UTC
[ notes ] Product-security takeaway: compliance alone is not enough; trustworthy devices require engineers fixing defects instead of burning cycles on endless triage.
[ source excerpt ] 4/ The goal is bigger than compliance: devices people can actually trust, and engineers who get to spend their time building instead of triaging.
5/ I've torn open enough cameras, routers, and IoT gear to know the SBOM and the actual binary almost never match. I constantly find develop...
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-10 14:47 UTC
[ notes ] Firmware teardown takeaway: SBOMs rarely match shipped binaries; expect leftover dev artifacts, debug access, and decade-old CVEs in cameras, routers, and IoT gear.
[ source excerpt ] 5/ I've torn open enough cameras, routers, and IoT gear to know the SBOM and the actual binary almost never match. I constantly find development artifacts, debug access, and CVEs a decade old. This is the work that has to happen before devices reach shelves. #ad https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20261110251092/en/Finite-State-Raises-%2427-Million-to-Help-Device-Makers-Fight-the-Vulnpocalypse-with-AI-Powered-Product-Security?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark
1/ Big news in product security: @FiniteStateInc raised a $27M Series C, led by The O.H.I.O. Fund, to help device makers fight the Vulnpocal...
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-10 14:47 UTC
[ notes ] FiniteStateInc raised a $27M Series C to scale pre-shelf product-security review for device makers, targeting vulnerability backlogs before hardware reaches shelves.
[ source excerpt ] 1/ Big news in product security: @FiniteStateInc raised a $27M Series C, led by The O.H.I.O. Fund, to help device makers fight the Vulnpocalypse. Here's why I think it matters.
A new #Prompt2Pwn CTF mission is coming, thanks to @pdiscoveryio. Your only hint for now: GTA. 👀 The CTF starts Nov 19 at noon PT: 48 hours,...
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-10 12:38 UTC
[ notes ] NahamCon P2P CTF runs Nov 19 at noon PT for 48 hours with 30+ challenges and $5,000+ prizes; the only hint so far is GTA.
[ source excerpt ] A new #Prompt2Pwn CTF mission is coming, thanks to @pdiscoveryio. Your only hint for now: GTA. 👀 The CTF starts Nov 19 at noon PT: 48 hours, 30+ challenges, $5,000+ in prizes. Details: https://p2p.nahamcon.com/
Anti bot mitigations block: Web fetch Curl Wget Puppeteer Playwright Chrome devtools mcp You don’t notice because it’s in a sub agent and yo...
source: Jason Haddix (@Jhaddix) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-10 02:07 UTC
[ notes ] Reminder that anti-bot stacks silently block curl/wget/Puppeteer/Playwright fetches -- when the hackbot's sub-agent goes quiet, roll your own HTTP requester and check the response codes.
[ source excerpt ] Anti bot mitigations block: Web fetch Curl Wget Puppeteer Playwright Chrome devtools mcp You don’t notice because it’s in a sub agent and your hackbot gives up silently. Roll your own requester.
[ notes ] SELinux frustration from an offensive researcher -- getting payloads, services or bind-mounted tooling past enforcing mode is a recurring friction point; flip to permissive to diff out the denial.
One way to tell if you have a really good harness / system is if it takes longer for you to see the improvements from new models. If you alr...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 23:46 UTC
[ notes ] Eval-harness take: a mature harness with high enforced standards absorbs new model gains slowly, so flat eval deltas can mean your harness is already doing the heavy lifting.
[ source excerpt ] One way to tell if you have a really good harness / system is if it takes longer for you to see the improvements from new models. If you already have high standards that are represented and enforced in your evals, model improvements are more subtle. @poteto @mattpocockuk
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 22:46 UTC
[ notes ] Cryptic 'credit rationing' jab -- reads as a dig at rate-limited API/credit budgets throttling automated tooling when you burn through quota mid-run.
[ source excerpt ] I'll take credit rationing for 100.
Thanks to our sponsor Doppel: why more headcount won't fix SOC alert fatigue, and how they automate triage and takedown. https://ul.live/dop...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 22:43 UTC
[ notes ] Sponsored pitch arguing SOC alert fatigue is a headcount problem, not a tooling one -- sketch is automated triage plus takedown of phishing/impersonation infrastructure, so read it as vendor framing rather than a primitive.
[ source excerpt ] Thanks to our sponsor Doppel: why more headcount won't fix SOC alert fatigue, and how they automate triage and takedown. https://ul.live/doppel_n550?utm_source=newsletter.danielmiessler.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=unsupervised-learning-no-550
Thanks to our sponsor Cyera: their research found 70 AI skills built to install Atomic macOS Stealer, all rated secure by a popular marketpl...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 22:43 UTC
[ notes ] 70 marketplace-published AI skills bundled Atomic macOS Stealer installers yet passed a popular marketplace's 'secure' rating -- supply-chain poisoning of agent/skill registries where review never touches the payload.
[ source excerpt ] Thanks to our sponsor Cyera: their research found 70 AI skills built to install Atomic macOS Stealer, all rated secure by a popular marketplace. https://ul.live/cyera_n550?utm_source=newsletter.danielmiessler.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=unsupervised-learning-no-550
Unsupervised Learning NO. 550 is out. ⚡ My new Vim distro, ULVim. It starts in 63ms. 📉 The Bitter Lesson, generalized 🪙 How North Korea went...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 22:43 UTC
[ notes ] Newsletter roundup with one item worth pulling: an Alpine OpenSSH bypass -- poking at musl/Alpine builds to see where auth paths diverge from glibc distros.
[ source excerpt ] Unsupervised Learning NO. 550 is out. ⚡ My new Vim distro, ULVim. It starts in 63ms. 📉 The Bitter Lesson, generalized 🪙 How North Korea went after $6.34B at Binance 🐧 One OpenAI run patched 948 Linux kernel bugs 💤 Agents that "dream" remember better Plus the Alpine OpenSSH bypass, Ukraine's missile gap, Gen Z's AI-on-AI job search, and more. https://newsletter.danielmiessler.com/p/unsupervised-learning-no-550
🚨 Fable 5.2 is out! - Massive benchmark jumps - Remote Labor Index: 41.3%, nearly double Opus 5.5's 21.3% - Cheaper than 5.1 (10/50->8/40) -...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 21:04 UTC
[ notes ] Model release notice, benchmark-only; no security content. Skip unless you want the pricing/timeout deltas for agent sandbox escape testing.
[ source excerpt ] 🚨 Fable 5.2 is out! - Massive benchmark jumps - Remote Labor Index: 41.3%, nearly double Opus 5.5's 21.3% - Cheaper than 5.1 (10/50->8/40) - Up to 30% faster, plus a fast mode up to 2.5x https://www.anthropic.com/claude-fable-and-mythos-5-2
As lower model versions are retired and higher ones replace them at similar costs, general AI safety will increase for organizations develop...
source: Jason Haddix (@Jhaddix) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 19:43 UTC
[ notes ] Takeaway: model upgrades raise baseline safety, but agent sandboxing stays unsolved -- real intrusions chain prompt injection -> web pentest -> LPE -> sandbox escape/exfil.
[ source excerpt ] As lower model versions are retired and higher ones replace them at similar costs, general AI safety will increase for organizations developing AI powered features. Agent control though, because it’s nuanced and no one has solved sandboxing, will still be a huge attack vector. Most real world attacks we’re pulling off these days require a mixture of skills: prompt injection, web pentesting, lpe, sandbox escape/exfil. Time to become multi dimensional fam 🫶 The AI Assessment world isn’t Gandalf level anymore.
CSS injection can be a lot more useful than you think
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-09 16:45 UTC
[ notes ] CSS injection as a real exfil primitive: attribute-selector leak of input values, plus data exfil via background-image and @font-face, all without touching the JS sink.
[ source excerpt ] CSS injection can be a lot more useful than you think
Here are some tips from episode 199 on hacking with AI agents! - An agent saying something is safe or unhackable shouldn't be the end of it,...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-09 15:30 UTC
[ notes ] Agent-hacking notes: never trust an agent's 'it's safe' verdict, since long runs anchor on one idea -- restart with the prior notes for a second opinion, and feed spec plus implementation together for weird binary protocols.
[ source excerpt ] Here are some tips from episode 199 on hacking with AI agents! - An agent saying something is safe or unhackable shouldn't be the end of it, long-running agents get stuck on one idea. We can spin up a fresh one, hand it the first one's notes and ask if it agrees... Or just check it yourself, stop being lazy! - Weird binary protocols get way less scary if we give it the spec and the implementation side by side, since it probably knows the spec better than we do and the differences are where the bugs hide, so we can use human reasoning on the comparison the AI made - "Find all the bugs" and such usually brings garbage, so a narrow job works better. Go narrow - Telling it how we think something works and asking it to confirm or deny beats asking for answers, since that's how we actually learn the architecture and start pointing it at the right spots - Short dupe windows reward speed more th...
Never deleting this app! I love stirring up some good Linux / OSS drama. 😅
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 15:26 UTC
[ notes ] Throwaway jab at Linux/OSS governance friction -- no technical payload, but maintainer burnout and slow patch turnaround are the real bug class behind most of that drama.
[ source excerpt ] Never deleting this app! I love stirring up some good Linux / OSS drama. 😅
I almost missed this bounty because I kept prompting my hackbot for access to internal host/metadata https://youtu.be/DhdJBwVZp5M
source: Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 13:45 UTC
[ notes ] Reminder from a bounty run: internal host and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) still pay -- keep probing them by hand instead of trusting the assistant to surface them.
[ source excerpt ] I almost missed this bounty because I kept prompting my hackbot for access to internal host/metadata https://youtu.be/DhdJBwVZp5M
Caido v0.59.0 is out 👌 You can now generate Workflows from a prompt. Connect an AI provider, describe what you need, and inspect or edit the...
source: Caido Official (@caidoio) | role: Guest Org (Emile Fugulin) | published: 2026-11-09 13:03 UTC
[ notes ] Caido v0.59.0 bolts on workflow generation from a plain-language description -- connect a backend, inspect/edit the generated nodes, then run passive, active or convert flows.
[ source excerpt ] Caido v0.59.0 is out 👌 You can now generate Workflows from a prompt. Connect an AI provider, describe what you need, and inspect or edit the generated nodes before running them. Whether you need passive, active or convert Workflow! All are in. Changelog: https://cai.do/36z
source: Matt Brown (@nmatt0) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 10:54 UTC
[ notes ] Containers are not cross-platform in practice -- syscall, cgroup and namespace differences between Linux/macOS/Windows kernels will break security tooling that assumes one runtime.
[ source excerpt ] "Docker is cross-platform". No, not really.
Not counting like a felony conviction, of course, but I don't think that's likely...hence the above.
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 08:48 UTC
[ notes ] Low-signal reply with no technical content -- skip it unless you care about the surrounding conversation about legal risk in disclosure work.
[ source excerpt ] Not counting like a felony conviction, of course, but I don't think that's likely...hence the above.
How are these metrics from Artificial Analysis so strange? @theo: Sol, Terra, Sonnet, and Muse above Fable 5.1? They go: 1️⃣ Opus 2️⃣ Astra ...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 04:27 UTC
[ notes ] Benchmark leaderboard disagreement: an aggregator's table and a personal ordering diverge hard -- check the harness and task set before trusting any single ranking, they are easy to game.
[ source excerpt ] How are these metrics from Artificial Analysis so strange? @theo: Sol, Terra, Sonnet, and Muse above Fable 5.1? They go: 1️⃣ Opus 2️⃣ Astra 3️⃣ Sol 4️⃣ Sonnet 5️⃣ Terra 6️⃣ Argon 7️⃣ Fable !!!! Here are my rankings: 1️⃣ Opus 2️⃣ Fable 3️⃣ Astra 4️⃣ Sol 5️⃣ Sonnet Which matches you?
https://thebenchmarks.ai (Inspired by @theo's version) I'd really like to see more people posting their own benchmarks based on the REAL WOR...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 04:27 UTC
[ notes ] Miessler pushes thebenchmarks.ai, arguing researchers should publish benchmarks built from their own real task workloads instead of borrowed synthetic evals -- useful frame for measuring exploit-dev and recon pipelines against repeatable work.
[ source excerpt ] https://thebenchmarks.ai (Inspired by @theo's version) I'd really like to see more people posting their own benchmarks based on the REAL WORK that they do.
There is roughly zero chance of Jensen being replaced as the leader of NVIDIA. He is the company.
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 03:13 UTC
[ notes ] Miessler's read: Jensen Huang is effectively inseparable from NVIDIA, so any 'he gets replaced' speculation is noise -- leadership-concentration risk rather than anything technical.
[ source excerpt ] There is roughly zero chance of Jensen being replaced as the leader of NVIDIA. He is the company.
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 03:08 UTC
[ notes ] Miessler's blog post argues vibe coding is not the same as using AI to code -- the distinction being whether you actually understand what the generated code does before it ships.
And this is not to say that it's always bad. I think there can be some value in early builders just messing around with it. But ultimately, ...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 03:06 UTC
[ notes ] Miessler concedes early builders can gain from messing around, but wants engineering judgment and architecture/security understanding kept human -- AI fills in the implementation inside those bounds.
[ source excerpt ] And this is not to say that it's always bad. I think there can be some value in early builders just messing around with it. But ultimately, I think people should be doing engineering with their own taste and preferences and deep understanding of how they implement important things like architecture and security and stuff like that. The AI should basically be doing all the work for you, but within those confines.
Here's how I captured this: Vibe Coding isn't using AI to code. Vibe Coding is when you have no idea what your AI is making for you. It's se...
source: Daniel Miessler (@DanielMiessler) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 02:57 UTC
[ notes ] Miessler's definition: vibe coding is shipping AI output with no idea what it did -- separation from understanding, the opposite of engineering; a fairness check when auditing AI-assisted exploit or tooling code.
[ source excerpt ] Here's how I captured this: Vibe Coding isn't using AI to code. Vibe Coding is when you have no idea what your AI is making for you. It's separation from understanding. The opposite of engineering. https://danielmiessler.com/blog/vibe-coding-isnt-using-ai
I (and @xssdoctor) were just talking about our experiences the other day, for bounty and pentest work. We have the opposite experience. Runn...
source: Jason Haddix (@Jhaddix) | role: Guest | published: 2026-11-09 01:19 UTC
[ notes ] Haddix and xssdoctor report abliterated models sharply change offensive-security chain-of-thought: normal models burn a big chunk of tokens arguing task validity, safety and scope, killing pentest and bounty outcomes.
[ source excerpt ] I (and @xssdoctor) were just talking about our experiences the other day, for bounty and pentest work. We have the opposite experience. Running Abliterated models drastically changes offsec CoT and hence outcomes for cyber testing. If you watch your chain of thought in a normal model, you’ll notice it taking a significant portion of your inference or tokens to argue about the tasks validity, safety, scope, and system prompt directives. PAGES of garbage reasoning polluting your attention mechanism for the transformer. It may get to “ok, I’ll do it” but you’ve wasted time, attention, and tokens, and have context pollution for future generations. Abliterated models don’t do this. That and they also have the latent space to ideate and find solutions to things a normal model won’t.
Hardware Hackalong starting in about an hour! Hackalongs are a Critical Thinker tier subscriber exclusive event. (= Join us at https://disco...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-08 15:57 UTC
[ notes ] Subscriber-only Hardware Hackalong session; operational takeaway is live hardware tear-down and collaboration, with no vulnerability details in the excerpt.
[ source excerpt ] Hardware Hackalong starting in about an hour! Hackalongs are a Critical Thinker tier subscriber exclusive event. (= Join us at https://discord.gg/ctbb
Here's a new way to make money in bug bounty: Intigriti's CrowdRecon pays researchers for their recon data on targets. Even if you haven't f...
source: Critical Thinking Podcast (@ctbbpodcast) | role: Official Show | published: 2026-11-08 14:00 UTC
[ notes ] Intigriti CrowdRecon pays researchers for recon data even without a confirmed bug; shifts bounty value toward asset discovery and attack-surface mapping.
[ source excerpt ] Here's a new way to make money in bug bounty: Intigriti's CrowdRecon pays researchers for their recon data on targets. Even if you haven't found a bug, you can still put that data to some good use! (= Join the waitlist here: https://www.criticalthinkingpodcast.io/Intigriti-CrowdRecon